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CASE DIGEST

This Case Digest provides brief analyses of cases that represent current aspects of transnational law. The Digest includes cases that establish legal principles and cases that apply established legal principles to
new factual situations. The cases are grouped in topical categories and
references are given for further research.
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I.
No

EXTRADITION

FIFTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO A SPEEDY EXTRA-

DITION.

Martin v. Warden, At. Penitentiary,993 F.2d 824 (11th Cir.

1993).
On December 13, 1974, as Thomas James Martin was driving to his
Canadian home, he ran over a seven-year old boy. Not knowing that he
had struck the child, Martin left the scene of the accident. Martin had
planned to return to the United States on January 1, 1975, as part of the
amnesty program for those who had fled the United States to avoid the
Vietnam draft. When he realized what he had done, Martin and his
family immediately left Canada for the United States. Two days later,
the Canadian authorities charged him with criminal negligence causing
death and leaving the scene of an accident.
At that time, the extradition treaty between the United States and
Canada did not reference either of these offenses.' In 1988 Canada and
the United States amended their treaty and deleted the schedule of extra1. Extradition Treaty, Dec. 3, 1971, U.S.-Can., art. 2, 27 U.S.T. 985.
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ditable offenses.2 The new treaty, which went into effect in November
1991, permits extradition for any conduct that constitutes an offense
punishable under the laws of both states by imprisonment of one year or
more.
In June 1992 the Canadian government sought to extradite Martin
under the new treaty. Police in the United States arrested him in July. A
magistrate ruled that Martin was not eligible for bail and could be extradited. The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia denied Martin's writ of habeas corpus and upheld the magistrate's order.3 Martin appealed, complaining that the extradition seventeen years after the accident constituted a denial of due process. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Held:
Affirmed. There exists no Fifth Amendment due process right to speedy
extradition.
The court noted that constitutional guarantees take precedence over
treaty provisions. By their nature, however, constitutional procedural
protections do not apply in extradition proceedings. An extradition magistrate holds a hearing simply to determine whether deportation comports with the provisions of the proper treaty or convention. As a result,
no Sixth Amendment right exists to a speedy trial in extradition cases.
The court held that the Fifth Amendment would not afford rights indirectly that the Sixth Amendment would not confer directly. Further,
the court recognized that granting a right to a speedy extradition would
force a treaty partner to adhere to the speedy trial rights of the United
States Constitution. To grant this right would violate the noninquiry
rule, which prohibits extradition courts from assessing the judicial system in the requesting state.
Finally, the court noted that to try Martin in Canada according to
Canadian law and procedure would not violate due process. Martin
could raise any further objection to extradition with the attorney general,
who makes the final decision on extradition.
The concurring judge agreed that delay alone does not violate Fifth
Amendment due process in extradition cases, but in some cases delay in
addition to other factors could implicate the Fifth Amendment.
Significance: Fifth Amendment due process protections do not guarantee a speedy extradition.

2.
423.
3.

Protocol Amending the Extradition Treaty, Jan. 11, 1988, U.S.-Can., 27 I.L.M.
804 F. Supp. 1530 (N.D. Ga. 1992).
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THE SUPPLEMENTAL TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES

AND

THE UNITED KINGDOM ALTERS TRADITIONAL EXTRADITION PROCEDURES.

In re Extradition of Howard, 996 F.2d 1320 (lst Cir. 1993).

On June 1, 1991, police in the United Kingdom found the body of a
murdered white female in the truck of an abandoned car at Gatwick
Airport. Evidence led the police to suspect that the murderer was Curtis
Andrew Howard, an African-American man. Howard returned to the
United States, and authorities in the United Kingdom sought to extradite
him.
Before a United States Magistrate, Howard did not refute the evidence that suggested that he had committed the murder. Instead, Howard argued that he could not be extradited because he would not receive
a fair trial in the United Kingdom. He claimed that British people were
prejudiced against African-Americans and that the British judicial system did not provide for voir dire of prospective jurors. The magistrate
ruled that Howard could be extradited and on appeal, the District Court
for the District of Massachusetts agreed.- On appeal, the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Held: Affirmed. The Supplemental Extradition Treaty between the United Kingdom and the United
States 5 represents a clean break from the prohibition on direct appeals in
extradition and from the traditional noninquiry rule on extradition.
Intepreting the plain language of the Supplemental Treaty between
the United States and the United Kingdom, the First Circuit found that
the treaty permitted successive appeals. The treaty expressly provides
that an accused may appeal an extradition decision to a district court or

a court of appeals. This provision contravenes the traditional rule that
an accused cannot directly appeal an extradition decision. The court,
however, found that the treaty specifically provides for at least one appeal as of right. The court further ruled that, in the absence of language
to the contrary, an accused is entitled to successive appeals under the
treaty. Thus, Howard had the right to appeal to the First Circuit, despite the fact that he had already appealed the magistrate's findings to
the district court.
The First Circuit applied the "clearly erroneous" standard of review
to the factual issues. In contrast, the court applied a de novo standard of
review to the legal questions, including the treaty interpretations.
Finally, the court addressed the noninquiry doctrine. Ordinarily in ex-

4. 791 F. Supp. 31 (D. Mass. 1992).
5. Supplemental Extradition Treaty, June 25, 1985, U.S.-U.K., reprinted in S.Exec.
Rep. No. 17, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 15-17 (1986).
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tradition proceedings, courts may not consider a requesting state's judicial system. The Supplemental Treaty contains a provision that permits
a country to deny extradition when the accused proves that the requesting party will punish on an improper basis." The court interpreted this
provision as congressional authorization to inquire into how a requesting
state's judicial system would treat a defendant.
Despite these departures from the traditional rules of extradition proceedings, the court ruled that the United Kingdom could extradite Howard. The accused did not meet his burden of proving actual prejudice
against him by a preponderance of the evidence.
The concurrence expressed concern that in permitting successive appeals, the court was injecting too much delay into the extradition process.
Significance: Parties subject to extradition under the Supplemental
Treaty between the United Kingdom and the United States have the
right to successive appeals. Courts ruling on extradition under this treaty
have the right to consider how the requesting state's judicial system will
treat a particular defendant.

II.

REFUGEES

THE PRESIDENT HAS THE POWER TO ORDER THE INTERCEPTION OF
SHIPS ON THE HIGH SEAS AND THE FORCIBLE REPATRIATION OF THE

Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.,
, 113 S.Ct. 2549 (1993).

PASSENGERS.
__

U.S.

The United States has had a long standing policy that authorizes the
United States Coast Guard to intercept vessels illegally transporting
Haitians to the United States in international waters. Under this policy,
the Coast Guard has the power to return these intercepted vessels to
Haiti. After taking office, President Bill Clinton issued an executive order continuing this policy.
Groups representing the intercepted Haitians brought suit in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, complaining that the policy violates Section 243(h)(1) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 19527 (INA) and Article 33 of the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees8 (Protocol). Both of
these provisions prohibit the deportation or return of an alien to a state
in which the alien's life or freedom would be threatened on the basis of

6.

Punishment based upon race, religion, nationality, or political belief is improper.

7.

8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (Supp. IV 1988).

8. United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, art.
33, 19 U.S.T. 6223.
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race, religion, nationality, or politics.
The Eastern District of New York denied the plaintiffs' motion to
enjoin the Coast Guard from returning these passengers to Haiti.9 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, finding
that these provisions did not apply exclusively to aliens already within
the United States.10 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court Held:
Reversed.
The Court focused on the precise language in both the INA and the
Protocol. In the absence of specific language indicating otherwise, acts of
Congress have no application outside the United States. The Court determined that the language of the INA did not suggest that Congress
intended the statute to have extraterritorial application. The statute expressly prohibits the attorney general from deporting political refugees.
The Court found that the United States authority extends only over
aliens within -the borders of the United States. The Coast Guard does
not act as an agent of the United States in international waters. As a
result, the INA does not apply to the Coast Guard's actions outside of
the United States.
The Court found the word choice in the statute to be particularly persuasive. The INA refers to "deport" or "return." The Coast Guard
neither deports nor returns intercepted Haitians because these Haitians
have not yet reached the United States. "Deport" applies to aliens officially within the United States, and "return" applies to aliens who may
be within the territory of the United States but are not there legally.
The Court used the same analysis on the language of Article 33 of the
Protocol. The Protocol is silent regarding any action a state may take
beyond its borders. The Supreme Court found that even if the spirit of
the Protocol would prohibit the Coast Guard's actions, the Protocol
could not impose restrictions upon a member state that were not contemplated when the state signed the Protocol. The Court concluded that the
Protocol was never intended to regulate a state's extraterritorial
behavior.
In dissent, Justice Blackmun rejected the majority's detailed scrutiny
of the language. He noted that the Court decided that "return" does not
mean return. Blackmun further noted that the convention had always
applied on the high seas before, and nonreturn had always been the
norm under the Protocol.
Significance: Neither the INA nor the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees prohibits the President from ordering the
9. Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. McNary, 807 F.Supp. 928 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
10. Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir. 1992).
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return of refugees who are intercepted outside of the United States
borders.
III.

TRADE/ENVIRONMENT

THE OFFICE OF THE TRADE REPRESENTATIVE MUST PREPARE AN
ENVIRONMENTAL

IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE NORTH AMERICAN

Public Citizen v. Office of United States
Trade Representative, 822 F. Supp. 21 (D.D.C. 1993).
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT.

On October 7, 1992, the leaders of Mexico, the United States, and
Canada signed a final draft of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)."1 The President of the United States agreed to put the
treaty on the "fast track" in Congress. When a treaty is placed on the
fast track, Congress has sixty legislative days to approve or reject the
treaty in its entirety. Neither the President nor Congress can make any
further changes to the document.
Three nonprofit groups with special interests in the environment sued
to compel the Office of the United States Trade Representative (OTR)
to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) on NAFTA. The
United States District Court for the District of Columbia Held:

Granted.
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)'2 requires that all
federal agencies prepare an EIS for every major legislative proposal and

for any other federal action that would have a significant impact on the
quality of the environment. The OTR argued that NEPA did not apply
to NAFTA.
The court found that it had jurisdiction over the matter based upon
the Administrative Procedures Act (APA),' 3 which grants judicial review
of any final action of a federal agency. The court found that the
NAFTA draft constituted a final action of the OTR. NAFTA became
final when the leaders of the three countries signed the agreement.
Neither the President nor Congress could make any revisions.
The court was equally unimpressed with the OTR's argument that
the treaty represented a presidential action rather than an agency act.
The OTR played a major role in negotiating and drafting the final
agreement. Based on that involvement, the court found that the OTR
11.
among
among
12.
13.

The agreement is a comprehensive document signed to create a free trading bloc
Mexico, the United States, and Canada. NAFTA affects every aspect of trade
these three countries.
42 U.S.C. § 421 et. seq. (1982).
5 U.S.C. § 701 et. seq. (1982).
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had a duty to prepare the EIS.
The court order requiring the OTR to prepare an EIS did not violate
the separation of powers. Congress enacted NEPA, and the United
States Constitution endows Congress with the foreign trade powers.
The court held that the plaintiffs had standing to seek declaratory relief because NAFTA poses environmental harm to certain members of
the organizations. The court cited United States v. SCRAP 14 to support
its decision. Accordingly, the plaintiff did not need a geographic nexus,
as the allegation of possible environmental harm from NAFTA was
enough to confer standing.
Significance: A plaintiff who might suffer from environmental harm
that may result from a federal agency act will have standing to seek a
motion to compel the agency to prepare an EIS. A final draft of a treaty
on the fast track through Congress is a completed act of the agency that
helped the President negotiate the treaty. Before Congress votes on the
treaty, the agency is responsible for preparing an EIS.
Editor's Note: Just as this issue of the VanderbiltJournal of TransnationalLaw was going to press, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the district court decision in
this case. Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representative, 1993
WL 371802 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 24, 1993). The D.C. Circuit found that
any effect NAFTA could have on Public Citizen would result from an
act of the President. OTR actions would not affect*Public Citizen. Consequently, the final draft of NAFTA, prepared without an EIS, did not
constitute a final agency action for which Public Citizen could seek judicial review. The court noted that until Congress votes on NAFTA, Public Citizen remains unaffected. The President, not OTR, will submit
NAFTA to Congress. Until then, the President has the ability to renegotiate the agreement or to decline to submit it to Congress. Only a presidential act can adversely affect Public Citizen, and such an act is not
subject to judicial review.

14.

412 U.S. 669 (1973).

